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Disappearing Acts – Toward a Global Civil Liability Regime for Pollution Damage
Resulting from Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration
Kissi Agyebeng

ABSTRACT
Civil liability for pollution damage is recognized and firmly established under
international law. However, there is no global international treaty that addresses this
issue with respect to offshore oil and gas exploration. This may be due partly to the
infrequency of the occurrence of offshore oil well blowouts. However, offshore
operations represent a constant threat to the marine environment since the risk of a
blowout leading to an ecological disaster is ever present. The trend has been the
adoption of regional agreements to tackle the issue. However, most of the regional
arrangements deal with the issue in a sidelong manner and they lack worldwide
application. The case is made that a global treaty on the subject is long overdue.

LL.B. (University of Ghana), LL.M. (Dalhousie Law School), LL.M. Candidate (Cornell Law School).

Dedicated to Phinna Agoe-Sowah – simply inspirational!

Introduction
Covering 72 per cent of the earth’s total surface area and with a total volume of 140
million square kilometers,1 the oceans represent a vast resource for the sustenance of
humankind. The sea is a channel of trade and commerce, a source of hydrocarbons from
which we get the most coveted source of energy – oil. For slightly over a century now
petroleum products have been the answer to the energy requirements of the world.
Though it began later than onshore oil exploration, offshore oil and gas exploration is
today as prevalent as the former and it is said to represent nearly a third of the world’s
hydrocarbon liquid production.2

The use of the oceans by the oil industry for production and transportation of petroleum
products present grave environmental challenges owing to the risk of pollution from oil
spills. The environmental carnage in the marine environment resulting from oil spills
from the Torrey Canyon (1967), Argo Merchant (1976), Amoco Cadiz (1978), Exxon
Valdez (1989), and the Sea Empress (1996), makes a strong case for the adoption of
effective pollution prevention measures.

At present, there exist countless international agreements dealing with marine pollution
prevention. Yet “[w]hile the primary aim of the international law relating to marine

1

Oceans and Law of the Sea, online: United Nations: Division for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>
2
HOSSEIN ESMAELI, THE LEGAL REGIME OF OFFSHORE OIL RIGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
12 (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 2001)[ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS].

pollution should be to prevent such pollution, a subsidiary aim should be to facilitate the
bringing of compensation claims by those who have suffered damage where pollution has
occurred.”3 The ex post facto concerns are equally as important as the ex ante
considerations.

The shipping industry, for instance, has been the subject of global international
agreements that address the issue of civil liability for damage arising from oil spills from
ships. There is, however, a distinct lack of a comprehensive and binding global
instrument that addresses this subject in relation to offshore oil and gas exploration.
Several rules are scattered in various international agreements but there is no uniformity
and definitiveness in their tenor. Even where these factors are present, the rules lack
worldwide application.

One reason which probably accounts for this state of affairs is the fact that there are very
few cases of oil rig blowout incidents at sea compared to tanker accidents,4 and the
“chances of a technical blow-out are known to be remote, thanks to the technological
achievements of recent years.”5 However, the “chance of a catastrophic blowout always
exist”6 because offshore operations present a constant risk of environmental pollution.7
Whatever the case may be, the risk of a tanker spill and a well blowout is the “same since
3

R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 358 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1999)[CHURCHILL AND LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA].
4
Bernard A. Dubais, The 1976 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from
Offshore Operations, 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 61 (1997)[Dubais, The 1976 London Convention].
5
Ibid. at 65.
6
ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 146.
7
John Warren Kindt, The Law of the Sea: Offshore Installations and Marine Pollution, 12 PEPP. L. REV.
381 (1985). Indeed, oil rig blow-outs at sea are not unknown. About 35 catastrophic blow-outs occurred
between 1955-1981 – see DOUGLAS BRUBAKER, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 38-40 (London and Florida: Belhaven Press, 1993).

[they result] from the action of the same polluting material (oil) introduced into the same
natural environment (the sea).”8

A second probable reason for the lack of a concrete global instrument on the subject is
the fact that offshore operations mostly take place on the continental shelf and therefore
fall under the direct jurisdiction of individual states under the maritime zones regime of
the Law of the Sea Convention.9 National laws therefore, regulate such operations. The
trend since the 1970s has been the adoption of several regional conventions which
attempt to deal with the subject because as one author observes,
…great geographical differences between various regions make efforts
towards global cooperation both extremely complicated and unnecessary.
As the presence of oil rigs and assorted platforms seems to be most
evident in coastal waters the pollution problems they cause are better
tackled by regional agreements that take into account the different
conditions of any particular area.10
Yet it is intriguing that the “great geographical differences” did not prevent or make it
unnecessary to adopt the LOSC to regulate the entirety of the oceans. Whatever be the
virtue in piecemeal regulation in this area, it is this writer’s conviction that there is an
urgent need for the harmonization of international law rules with the aim of establishing a
binding and uniform civil liability regime with global reach for pollution damage
resulting from offshore operations. This will engender predictability of the limits of
liability.

8

Bernard A. Dubais, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation
of Hydrocarbons in the Seabed, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 549, 553 (1975) [Dubais, Compensation].
9
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 December 1982), 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [Hereafter
referred to as LOSC].
10
MARIA GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
(London/Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1995) 39 [GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION].

It is prudent also to stress that despite the division of the sea into regions, the various
segments possess physical and geomorphologic unity. The oceans do not exist mutually
exclusive of each other. The sea is one big collection of water with the exception of the
so-called closed seas. The divisions are imaginary and they find their explanation in
convenience. Pollution in one area will seep into the other regardless of our imaginary
boundaries.

Transboundary pollution may erode any efforts at regulation in the area which suffers the
damage. “In other words, the resources of the [sea] constitute one proprietary unity in a
physical sense”11 and “[i]n spite of the common but highly deceptive practice of dividing
the world ocean into a discreet set of “seven seas”… all the world’s seas are in reality
part of a single interconnected world ocean…”12 The high seas and other areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction become even more vulnerable to the deleterious effects
of pollution in the absence of a global instrument on civil liability.

This paper examines the present state of the civil liability and compensation regime under
international law for pollution damage resulting from offshore exploration for oil and gas.
The case is made that the scattered international law rules regulating this area should be
harmonized into a single and binding international convention with global reach. The
interests of both the industry and claimants will be better served when the rules are
defined, identifiable, concrete, determinative and binding.

11

David Dzidzornu, Marine Pollution Control: The Evolving International Law, 2 AUSTRALASIAN J.
OF NATURAL RESOURCES L. & POL’Y 111, 122 (1995) [original emphasis].
12
Charles E. Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New Millennium, 31
OCEAN DEVEL. & INT’L L. 7, 21 (2000).

This paper is divided into five parts. Part I takes a brief look at the impact of oil spills and
other polluting substances relating to offshore operations on the marine environment. Part
II is an analysis of the customary international law position on civil liability for marine
pollution. Part III examines the international treaty law on the subject. Part IV is an
excursion through existing regional arrangements that attempt to deal with the subject,
especially under the UNEP Regional Seas Programme.13 Part V is an attempt to
assimilate civil liability rules in the shipping industry to offshore operations.

Part I – Oil and Other Matter in the Ocean
Though “it is easier in the case of offshore exploration to take necessary precautions to
avoid an accident or to limit its effects even before undertaking the drilling of a well”,14
in reality offshore exploration exerts a heavy pollution toll on the marine environment.
Article 1(4) of the LOSC defines pollution as:
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely
to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine
life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use
of sea water and reduction of amenities.
From seismic survey, to exploration and appraisal, through development and production
to abandonment of rigs and wells, the industry introduces pollutants into the marine

13

The UNEP Regional Seas Programme is made up of more than 140 coastal states participating in 13
regional programmes designed to address the accelerating degradation of the world’s oceans and coastal
areas – Regional Seas Programme, online: United Nations Environment Programme
<http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/home/over.htm>
14
Dubais, Compensation, supra note 8 at 551.

environment.15 Pollution from offshore operations may be deliberate or accidental.16 It
may result from “blow-outs (i.e. the escape of oil or gas resulting from the loss of control
over the flow from a well); rupture of a pipeline; a collision between a ship and an
installation; an accident while a tanker is being loaded from an installation; or destruction
of a suspended well-head or sub-sea completion system”;17 operational discharges; and
the dumping of oil rigs at sea.

It is said that “oil remains the main marine pollution problem [especially] due to the fact
that human ingenuity has not so far perfected any reasonable method of removing oil
from water.”18 Oil in the marine environment exerts negative biological (lethal, sublethal, physical smothering, and tainting of sea foods) effects and adverse ecological
impact on the shorelines, open waters, the seabed, wetlands, corals, fisheries and coastal
amenities.19
It is also maintained that the deleterious effects of operational discharges are minimal.20
Nevertheless, the major emission – produced water – “does have a higher salinity and
temperature [than seawater] which can modify the species composition in the vicinity of
the outfall.”21

15

Zhiguo Gao, Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: An
Introduction and Overview in ZHIGUO GAO, ED., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OIL AND
GAS 3, 5 (London: Kluwer Law International Ltd., 1998).
16
CHURCHILL AND LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 3 at 371.
17
Ibid.
18
EDGAR GOLD, GARD HANDBOOK ON MARINE POLLUTION, 2nd ed., 293 (Arendal: Gard,
1998).
19
Ibid.
20
H. Pickering, A New Era for the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry on the UKCS, 23 MARINE POLICY
329, 338 (1999).
21
Ibid. at 377.

The decommissioning and dumping of offshore installations also raise environmental
concerns. Disposal options include leaving them in place; finding alternative uses for
them; moving them to shore for recycling or using them to create artificial reefs.22
Dumping the structures in the sea or leaving them in place “is hazardous to the
environment because of the potential pollution from the accumulation of contaminated
drill cuttings at the base of the platforms or from the materials and substances on
board.”23

From the foregoing, it is clear that pollution damage from offshore operations is real and
cannot be over-emphasized. We will now turn our attention to civil liability for pollution
damage under customary international law.

Part II – International Custom
According to article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the sources
of international law include “international custom, as evidenced of a general practice
accepted as law.” It has been expressed that “the identification of customary law always
has been, and remains, particularly problematical, requiring the exercise of skill,
judgment, and considerable research.”24

However, with respect to civil liability for pollution damage it may safely be said that at
customary law, the rule is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas – one must use his own so

22

ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 192-195.
Ibid. at 193.
24
P.W. BIRNIE AND A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Oxford
and New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1992).
23

as not to damage that of another. This rule finds its reason in common sense. Its
international law origin appears to be the Trail Smelter Arbitration25 where it was held
that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury…in or to the territory of another or the properties of the persons therein.”
Similar conclusions were reached in the later decisions in the Corfu Channel,26 Lake
Lanoux27 and Nuclear Tests cases.28

Although the cases cited do not directly address pollution damage resulting from offshore
operations, their reasoning can be reasonably stretched to cover such activities since they
establish the general principle of state responsibility for transboundary pollution. This is
so as long as states retain jurisdiction over offshore operations in their coastal waters. The
general principle may also be extended to “apply to incidents which arise outside the
territory of the defendant state, but where the wrongdoer is nonetheless subject to the
defendant state’s jurisdiction.”29
It is also instructive to recall the admonishing of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (UNCHE).30 While recognizing the sovereign right of states to
exploit their natural resources, Principle 21 of UNCHE enjoins states to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
25

Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), (1931-1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905.
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4 at p.22.
27
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), (1957) 12 R.I.A.A. 281.
28
Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France). See also the ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility – International Law Commission, Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities), Report of the International Law Commission, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, U.N. Doc A/56/10, chp. V.E.I.
29
Barney T. Levantino, Protection of the High Seas from Operational Oil Pollution: A Proposal, 6
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 72, 92 (1982).
30
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, (5-16 June 1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416.
26

other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. More importantly,
Principle 22 of UNCHE calls on states to cooperate for the development of liability and
compensation regimes for victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused
by activities within their jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.

We may also call into play the recent Rio Declaration.31 Principles 2 and 13 stress
Principles 21 and 22 of UNCHE respectively. Principle 16 then goes on to underline the
polluter-pays principle which requires that the cost of pollution is to be borne by the
polluter “with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade
and investment.”

Closely related to and based upon the sic utere tuo doctrine is the principle of good
neighbourliness. Article 74 of the UN Charter provides that:
Members of the United Nations also agree in their policy in respect of the
territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their
metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good
neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of
the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.
Although this section applies to non-governing territories, the principle expressed therein
is germane to our purpose. Indeed, a good neighbour is the one who does not injure his
neighbour through the activities under his control. Any contrary view would be an
invitation to international lawlessness and against the principle of abuse of right.32

31
32

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (June 1992), 31 I.L.M. 874.
See Article 300 of the LOSC.

Notwithstanding these identifiable principles under customary international law, they are
deliberative and merely declaratory of general principles recognizing civil liability for
pollution. The principles set no standards and procedures for determining the limits of
liability. In particular, the sic utere tuo doctrine “is too uncertain to provide a precise
obligation upon states to prevent marine pollution … because it lacks any indication with
respect to compensation for environmental damage.”33 We will next examine the
international treaty law position.

Part III – Global Conventions
a) The Regime
The sic utere tuo and good neighbourliness principles have found express recognition
under international treaty law. Almost every international environmental law instrument
incorporates these principles in their provisions. The following is an examination of the
relevant global treaties.

i) The 1958 Geneva Conventions
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea sought to establish a global
regulatory regime for the marine environment with modest success. The conference
adopted four conventions. However, only two of the conventions are relevant here.34 The
Continental Shelf Convention vests in the coastal state sovereign rights over the

33

ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 151.
These are Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, 449 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereafter cited as the
Continental Shelf Convention]; and the Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285
[hereafter cited as the High Seas Convention].

34

continental shelf for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of its resources,35
including the right to construct and maintain or operate installations necessary for such
purpose.36 However, such activities must not unjustifiably interfere with navigation,
fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea.37 In addition, disused or
abandoned installations must be entirely removed.38 Beyond these provisions, no attempt
whatsoever is made to address the question of liability for pollution damage.

The High Seas Convention urges states to cooperate to draw regulations and measures to
prevent pollution on the high seas. The closest this convention comes to the issue of
liability for pollution damage is Article 28, which mandates states to take necessary
legislative measures to ensure that owners of a pipeline beneath the high seas bear the
cost of the destruction of other pipelines.

ii) LOSC
The LOSC, which supersedes the 1958 Conventions, seeks to settle all issues relating to
the law of the sea. A general obligation is placed upon states to protect and preserve the
environment in relation to offshore operations in line with the sic utere tuo principle.39
The preventive obligations are carried further by urging states to cooperate on a global
basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment generally and in particular with respect to offshore operations.40

35

Article 2(1).
Article 5(2).
37
Article 5(1).
38
Article 5(5).
39
Articles 192, 193, 194, and 195.
40
Articles 197 and 208.
36

On the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, states have the
responsibility to ensure that activities therein are carried out in conformity with the
provisions of the LOSC.41 Damage caused by default of responsibility entails liability.
However, a state is not liable for damage caused by a person it has sponsored if the state
in question has taken all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective
compliance.42

Annex III of the LOSC also contains detailed rules on the basic conditions of
prospecting, exploration and exploitation of the ocean floor and seabed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. Article 22 of Annex III in particular holds a contractor liable for
any damage arising from a wrongful act in the conduct of its operations. The extent of
liability is stated to be the actual amount of damage.

iii) Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention (OPRC)43
As the name suggests, the OPRC is designed to rally states to prepare for and effectively
respond to oil pollution incidents. It is largely geared toward the establishment of
efficient global and regional reporting systems to arrest in time the deleterious effects of
oil pollution whenever and wherever they occur. It, therefore, mandates states to require
operators of offshore units under their jurisdiction to have oil pollution emergency
plans.44

41

Articles 139(1) and 145.
Article 139(2).
43
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, (30 November
1990), 30 I.L.M 733.
44
Article 3(3).
42

The OPRC has been hailed as the most efficient global instrument on the subject of
pollution from offshore oilrigs.45 However, despite the fact that it calls for the application
of the polluter pays principle in its preamble, it contains no provision on the issue of
liability for pollution damage.

iv) London Dumping Convention46
We have noted that the decommissioning and disposal of oilrigs raises environmental
concerns. The contracting parties of the London Dumping Convention pledge themselves
to promote measures to protect the marine environment against pollution caused, inter
alia, by hydrocarbons, including wastes from offshore operations.47 The issue of civil
liability for pollution damage is dealt with, so to say, under article 10, which states that:
In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State
responsibility for damage to the environment of the other States or to any
other area of the environment, caused by dumping wastes and other matter
of all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake to develop procedures for
the assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding
dumping.

b) Evaluation of the Global Conventions
The state of international global treaty law on civil liability for pollution damage from
offshore operations leaves much to be desired. There is a tendency in the treaties
discussed to ignore the issue. Where an attempt is made to address the issue it is dealt
with in a deliberative and side-wind fashion. What one finds are countless exhortations to
states to take preventive measures against pollution. Liability and compensation issues
45

ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 158.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, (29
December 1972).
47
Article 12 (a), (c) and (f).
46

are relegated to the background for future consideration, perhaps awaiting the occurrence
of a major catastrophe before action is taken to contain the effects. The current situation
is too reminiscent of the painful fact that international law is always a step behind reality.

The LOSC in particular is a major disappointment in view of the lukewarm manner with
which it tackles the issue. Even under Annex III where pollution damage is stated to
attract liability for offshore contractors on the high seas, the scope and extent of liability
is not defined. This will be a perfect recipe for dispute and disagreement.

A common theme, which runs through the global conventions, is admonishing of states to
cooperate to adopt regional instruments to address the issue. This factor, coupled with the
recognition in the conventions that national laws are not to be less effective in preventing,
reducing and controlling pollution, have given credence to the continued proliferation of
regional agreements to which we now turn our attention.

Part IV – Regional Agreements
i) The Persian Gulf
The sea area shared by Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates represents the Persian Gulf, which supplies almost 60 per cent of the oil
required by industrial nations.48

The Kuwait Regional Convention49 and its three protocols50 regulate activities in this
area. Apart from general obligations to prevent marine pollution, the convention places a
48

ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 164.

specific duty on the parties to take all appropriate measures to “prevent, abate, and
combat pollution…resulting from exploration and exploitation of the bed of the territorial
sea and its sub-soil and continental shelf...”51 The parties then undertake to co-operate to
formulate appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of civil liability and
compensation schemes for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment.52

The Kuwait Exploration Protocol follows the mother convention in imposing obligations
for marine pollution prevention. Regrettably, it is dead silent on the issue of liability for
pollution damage.

ii) The Mediterranean Sea
The 1976 Barcelona Convention is the framework agreement governing the
Mediterranean Sea, which borders 21 states and 3 continents. The parties to the
convention are obliged to combat pollution resulting from offshore operations.53 The
parties also pledge to “cooperate as soon as possible in the formulation and adoption of
appropriate procedures for the determination of liability and compensation for damage
resulting from the pollution of the marine environment.”54

49

Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution, 1978, Int’l Envt. Rep’r p.21: 2721.
50
The relevant one is Protocol Concerning Marine Pollution from Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, 29
March [Hereafter referred to as the Kuwait Exploration Protocol].
51
Article 7.
52
Article 13.
53
Article 7.
54
Article 12.

The Mediterranean Exploration Protocol is also relevant here.55 Offshore activities in the
coverage area are subject to prior written authorization from the concerned authority.56
The protocol requires state parties to impose a general obligation upon operators of
offshore installations to use the best available, environmentally effective and
economically appropriate techniques while observing internationally accepted standards
regarding wastes, well use, storage and discharge of harmful or noxious substances.57 An
operator is also obliged to remove any installation that is abandoned or disused.58
Sanctions are to be imposed for illegal disposal of wastes and harmful or noxious
substances59 and for breach of obligations by operators.60

Article 27 of the Mediterranean Exploration Protocol is very instructive. Under this
provision, the parties undertake to cooperate as soon as possible to formulate and adopt
appropriate rules and procedures for determining liability and compensation schemes for
offshore pollution damage. In the interim, however, the parties are required to impose
liability and compensation schemes upon operators. The guiding principle here is that the
compensation to be paid must be prompt and adequate.

iii) The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
Holding some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves and bordered by Djibouti, Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area is
55

Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, 1994.
56
Article 4.
57
Article 8.
58
Article 20.
59
Article 13.
60
Article 7.

governed by the 1982 Jeddah Convention.61 This convention is not too different from the
previously discussed conventions. It only urges the parties to cooperate in the formulation
of civil liability and compensation rules and procedures for pollution damage.62
Moreover, its relevant protocol63 contains no provision of substance on the question of
liability.

iv) The Nordic Area
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden adopted the Environmental Protection
Convention64 to guard against environmentally harmful activities. Such activities are
defined to include the discharge from installations of solid or liquid waste and gas into
the sea and the use of such installations in a manner that entails pollution of same. The
convention is made applicable to the continental shelves of the parties.

A person who has suffered pollution damage from environmentally harmful activities has
a right of audience before the courts or the administrative authority of the state under
whose jurisdiction the activities were carried out.65 The forum for redress is mandated to
determine issues of compensation for damage.66 “The question of compensation shall not
be judged by rules which are less favourable to the injured party than the rules of
compensation of the State in which the activities are being carried out.”67

61

The

Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982.
Article 13.
63
Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil in Cases of Emergency,
Jeddah, 14 February 1982.
64
Nordic Environmental Protection Convention, Stockholm, 19 February 1974.
65
Article 3.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
62

supervisory authority of a state party also has the right to institute proceedings in another
contracting state for the purpose of guarding its interests.68

v) The Baltic Sea
The 1992 Helsinki Convention,69 which entered into force on 17 January 2000, replaces
the 1974 Convention bearing the same name. The 1992 Convention seeks to assure the
ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea by ensuring the possibility of self-regeneration of
the marine environment.70 States are urged to preserve the marine environment by
application of the precautionary principle to prevent pollution from offshore operations.71

On the question of liability for pollution damage, the parties are simply obliged to apply
the polluter-pays principle72 and to jointly develop rules concerning damage resulting
from acts or omissions in contravention of the convention.73 Such rules must incorporate
limits of responsibility, criteria and procedures for the determination of liability and
available remedies.74

vi) West and Central Africa
From Mauritania running through the west coast of Africa down to Namibia, and
splashing the shores of the oil powerhouse of Nigeria, the West and Central African

68

Article 4.
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, Helsinki, 1992.
70
Ibid. Preamble.
71
Articles 3 and 12.
72
Article 3(4).
73
Article 25.
74
Ibid.
69

Marine Region is governed by the Abidjan Convention75 and its Emergency Protocol.76
Noting that existing conventions concerning the marine environment do not address
extensively issues under its coverage, the Abidjan Convention imposes a duty on its
parties to take appropriate measures to preserve the marine environment.77 The parties
undertake to co-operate in the formulation and adoption of appropriate rules on the issue
of liability for pollution damage. The Emergency Protocol contains no helpful provisions
for our purpose.

vii) East African Region
Spanning the marine area from Southern Somalia to Northern South Africa, the East
African Region is governed by the Nairobi Convention78 and its two Protocols.79 Set
along the lines of the Abidjan Convention, the Nairobi Convention imposes a general
obligation upon the parties to prevent pollution from seabed activities and to cooperate
for the formulation of pollution damage liability principles in accordance with
international law principles. None of the Nairobi Protocols contains any provision of
substance with respect to liability.

75

Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment
of West and Central Africa Region, Abidjan, 23 March 1981
76
Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency, Abidjan, 23 March
1981.
77
Article 4.
78
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of
the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 21 June 1985.
79
Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollution in Cases of Emergency in the Eastern
African Region, Nairobi, 21 June 1985; Protocol concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in
the Eastern Africa Region, 21 June 1985.

viii) The Wider Caribbean Region
This region encompasses all the insular and coastal states and territories bordering the
Caribbean Sea, including Belize and the Gulf of Mexico to Guyana. It is governed by the
Cartagena de Indias Convention80 and its Oil Spills Protocol.81 While the Protocol
focuses on emergency response to catastrophic oil spills and contains nothing on liability
for damage caused by such spills, the Convention merely admonishes the parties to
cooperate for the formulation of liability rules.

ix) South Pacific
The Island dominated South Pacific is governed by the Noumea Convention82 and its
Protocols.83 The comments on the Cartegena de Indias agreements concerning the Wider
Caribbean area apply to the Noumea treaties.

x) South-East Pacific
Spanning the entire length of the Pacific coast of South America from Panama to Cape
Horn, the South Pacific Marine Region is governed by the Lima Convention together
with five protocols and two more protocols in the offing.84 It should be pointed out that
none of the protocols provides any rules on civil liability for pollution damage. Aside
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from the usual obligations to prevent pollution of the marine environment and
exhortations to adopt rules on the issue of pollution civil liability, the Lima Convention
obliges the parties to “ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal
systems for compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused.85

xi) North-East Pacific
Lying to the west of Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua and Panama, the North-East Pacific region is governed by the recent Antigua
Convention.86 It imposes the usual general obligations for pollution prevention on the
basis of the precautionary principle. It also calls for the application of the polluter- pays
principle by “virtue of which those responsible for pollution should pay the full costs of
measures to prevent, control, reduce and remedy such pollution, with due regard for the
public interest.”87 The adoption of liability and compensation rules on pollution damage
is postponed to be dealt with in a future protocol.88

xi) The Black Sea
Lodged between southeastern Europe and Asia Minor and connected to the
Mediterranean Sea by the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara, and to the Sea of Azov by
the Strait of Kerch, the Black Sea is governed by the Bucharest Convention89and its two
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protocols.90 The convention obliges each party to adopt rules and regulations on liability
for pollution damage from offshore operations,91 with the aim of ensuring the highest
degree of deterrence and protection of the Black Sea.92 The compensation payable should
be prompt and adequate with recourse for redress in accordance with the legal systems of
the parties.93 No useful purpose will be served by discussing the two Bucharest Protocols
since they contain nothing on civil liability for pollution damage resulting from offshore
operations.
xii) North-East Atlantic
The 1992 OSPAR Convention94 governs the North-East Atlantic as it replaces the 1972
Oslo Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and the
1974 Paris Convention on the prevention of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources.
The OSPAR Convention contains comprehensive provisions on the prevention of
pollution from offshore activities.95 On the issue of liability, Article 2(2)(b) requires the
application, without more, of the “polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of
pollution prevention, control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter.”
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xiii) The North Sea
The North Sea contains Western Europe’s largest oil and natural gas reserves.96 The
1983 Bonn Agreement97, which governs this area, is dedicated to preventing grave and
imminent danger to coastal areas by oil spills and other harmful substances. It merely
stresses that its provisions do not prejudice the rights of a party of being reimbursed for
costs of action dealing with pollution or the threat of pollution.

However, seven years prior to the adoption of the Bonn Agreement, Belgium, Denmark,
France, the former West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom adopted the London Civil Liability Convention (LCLC).98 This
convention applies exclusively to pollution damage resulting from an incident occurring
beyond the coastal low-water line at an installation under the jurisdiction of a Controlling
State,99 and suffered in the territory of and areas within which a State Party exercises
sovereign rights over natural resources.

The LCLC establishes a strict liability regime under which operators of an installation are
jointly and severally liable for any pollution damage resulting from an incident.100
However, no liability arises where it is established that the damage resulted from an act
of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, an act or omission done with intent to cause

9696

Country Analysis Brief: North Sea, online: EIA <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/northsea.html>
Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and other Harmful
Substances.
98
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation
of Seabed Mineral Resources, (16 May 1977), 16 I.L.M. 1451.
99
Defined as a State Party which exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the resources of
the seabed and its subsoil in the area in or above which the installation is situated – Article 1(4).
100
Article 3.
97

damage by the person suffering the damage, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable and irresistible character.101
An offshore installation operator is entitled to limit his liability for each installation and
each incident to the reviewable amount of 30m Special Drawing Rights.102 However, he
is not entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the damage occurred because of an
act or omission by the operator, done deliberately with the actual knowledge that
pollution would result.103

A claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought against the operator or
directly against his insurer104 but only in the courts of the State party where the damage
was suffered.105 Compensation rights are effectively extinguished four years after a
cause of action arises.106 A recognized judgment is enforceable in each state party as soon
as formalities required in that state have been complied with.107 Finally, a state is not
prevented from providing for unlimited liability or a higher limit than what is specified
under the convention.108
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xiv) United States / Mexico Marine Pollution Agreement109
This agreement was brokered following the Ixtoc I offshore well blowout off the Bay of
Campeche on 3 June 1980. It calls for preventive measures aimed at eliminating the
threat of marine pollution by petroleum in all its forms. The agreement contains no
concrete provisions on civil liability for such pollution.

xv) Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL)110
OPOL is not an agreement between states. It is a contract among operators of, and those
who intend to become operators of, offshore facilities used in connection with
exploration for or production of oil and the exploration of or appraisal of gas.111 It is
intended to provide an orderly means for compensation and reimbursing any person who
incurs costs for taking remedial measures as a result of a discharge of oil from an
offshore facility. It should be noted that the agreement is not applicable to abandoned
wells, installations or pipelines.112

OPOL establishes a strict liability regime under which a person who has sustained
damage or taken remedial measures against the polluting effects of the offshore
operations of a party is entitled to be compensated or reimbursed, up to a maximum limit
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of $120,000,000 per incident, subject to some provisos.113 Defenses similar to those
under the LCLC are available to an operator.114 A cause of action extinguishes one year
from the time it arose.115 A cause of action is to be submitted to arbitration in London in
line with the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.116 This forum is exclusive
for disposing of such disputes.117

Evaluation of the Regional Agreements
The dreary descriptive analysis of the various regional and other agreements was
intended to reveal the unconvincing and highly unsatisfactory state of civil liability
regime for pollution damage resulting from offshore operations. A charitable observation
is that the world community appears to find solace and virtue in inaction where action is
gravely needed. The trend so far has been to stall and wait for the occurrence of an
incident of immense catastrophic proportions, by which time the remedial measures may
be rendered nugatory.

It is disturbing that most of the regional arrangements do not deal directly with the issue
of civil liability and compensation for pollution damage. The sad practice has been
merely high sounding admonishing of states to take future action to develop liability rules
– a future which never appears to arrive and perhaps may never arrive – “tomorrow is
another day, in the immortal words of the cinematic star.”118
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Even where an attempt is made to address the issue of liability directly, the principles are
generally and painfully captured in the hallowed words – “the parties shall apply the
polluter-pays principle” – and nothing more. A few of the agreements, including the
Nordic, Bucharest and Lima Conventions, deserve particular commendation, though not
too highly, for the attempt made therein to go beyond the mere future aspirations. The
LCLC is undoubtedly the most important and comprehensive international agreement on
civil liability for pollution damage resulting from offshore operations. However, it is not
in force and like the other regional agreements, it lacks global application.

OPOL is also hugely commendable for its definitive and determinate provisions.
However, it is a private contract that cannot “fully compensate for the lack of a
comprehensive, worldwide, legally binding document that would address the issues of
pollution from offshore installations and compensation for damage caused by it in a
global perspective.”119

It should also be noted that the absence of a global convention on the issue of civil
liability for pollution damage resulting from offshore operations, coupled with the fact
the regional agreements apply to areas within the jurisdiction of state parties, means that
no liability regime applies to the high seas and other areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. In the next part, we will attempt to ascertain whether the liability rules
regulating the shipping industry may be assimilated to apply to offshore installations.
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Part V – Offshore Oil Rigs as Ships
We have noted that unlike the case with offshore installations, civil liability for ship
source pollution damage is well defined in global conventions.120 The shipping
conventions are designed to ensure the payment of adequate compensation to sufferers of
pollution damage. The regime endangers certainty for both the industry and claimants.

In the absence of a global civil liability convention regulating offshore activities, it may
be worthwhile to ascertain whether offshore installations qualify as ships under the
shipping conventions so as to assimilate those rules to apply to them. The analogy is
often drawn between oilrigs and ships in the oil and gas industry for the reason that:
There are several basic (and conceptually important) similarities between
transnational injury caused by a tanker spill and transnational injury
caused by an offshore drilling platform blowout. First, both situations
present the prospect of extensive liability to the individual or entity found
to be responsible for the underlying activity. Second, both of the
underlying activities are extremely valuable to the international
community; and that community has a strong economic interest in
promoting those activities. Finally, it would be impossible through the
exercise of due care to totally eliminate the risks of harm inherent in those
activities.121
i) Types of Offshore Oil Rigs
It is prudent to consider the different types of rigs for offshore operations before we go
into the definitions. Offshore oilrigs may be classified into mobile units and fixed
platforms. The first category rigs are generally classified as floating and bottom-
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supported.122 Floating rigs include drill ships,123 semi-submersibles124 and barges.125
Bottom-supported rigs include submersibles126 and jack-up drills.127 Fixed platforms on
the other hand, are similar to onshore oilrigs though they possess more elaborate
features.128 Any assimilation of rules from the shipping industry must take the differences
into consideration.

ii) The Definitions
The definition of ship in international law is function and object specific. Hence, no
standard definition exists. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention129 defines ship in article 1
as “any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying
oil in bulk as cargo”. It appears that this definition does not apply to oilrigs because even
the mobile rigs are not designed to carry oil in bulk as cargo.130

The definition of ship under the 1971 Fund Convention131 is the same as that of the 1969
Civil Liability Convention. The 1992 Protocol to amend the 1969 Convention is even
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more definite on excluding oilrigs from its purview. Article 1 defines a ship as:
…any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided
that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a
ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any
voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues
of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.
It appears that the 2001 Bunker Convention provides a leeway.132 Article 1 defines a ship
widely as “any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever.” Mobile
offshore units may fall within this definition hence enabling the application of the
liability rules under the convention to be applicable to them. Article 2 makes the Bunker
Convention apply exclusively to pollution damage caused in the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones of party states. Therefore, it is inapplicable to areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.

Concluding Remarks
We have pointed out that there is a distinct absence of a global instrument on civil
liability for pollution damage arising from offshore operations. We have noted the
adverse effects of pollution from such activities. We have examined the international
customary and treaty law position on the issue. We have traversed various regional
agreements with no avail. We just attempted, with little success to assimilate the civil
liability regime of the shipping industry to offshore operations. The irresistible
conclusion is that the present state of the civil liability regime for pollution damage from
offshore operations typifies the doomsday adage – “between the Devil and the deep blue
sea”.
132
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A global instrument on the subject is badly needed. Such an arrangement must possess
certain salient features, including making it applicable to all zones of the sea. Another
feature should be an efficient enforcement mechanism defined by Reisman as “a
purposive particularization of a public sanctioning system.”133 The absence of a potent
enforcement mechanism would render the arrangement a mere declaration of intentions.
Private individuals should also be given the right of audience before the system’s
adjudicating forum.

A very important feature should, off course, be the basis and extent of liability of the
tortfeasor. From the authorities liability may be strict, absolute or based upon fault
(negligence). Each type has its own pros and cons depending on whether the beholder is a
claimant or a defendant.

Liability is absolute where the defendant is afforded no defence whatsoever. The entirety
of the loss falls on him without any due consideration of extenuating factors, which may
diminish his responsibility for the damage caused. The defendant is liable for damage
caused in relation to his operations even if the incident in question is attributable to an act
or omission of a third party. This type of liability perhaps owes its origin to the common
law tort doctrine of absolute liability beginning with the celebrated English case of
Rylands v. Fletcher.134
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Liability based on negligence holds the defendant liable for only the damage resulting
from an incident that is attributable to his lack of taking reasonable care to prevent the
occurrence of the incident in question. Thus, he is exculpated from liability if he is able to
show that he took all due care and yet the incident occurred because it defies the taking of
utmost care.

Strict liability is a moderation of absolute liability. It is a compromise between the
considerations – “if the defendant has some dangerous thing under his control which
subsequently causes damage why should a plaintiff have to prove negligence?”135 – and
“is it equitable that the defendant should be liable for circumstances beyond his
control?”136 Under this rubric, the defendant is made liable for damage resulting from
and in relation to his industry. However, he is afforded defences like act of God, act of
war, act of state, acts or omissions of a third party, and intentional acts of a claimant
calculated to cause the harm complained of.

It is submitted that a global treaty on civil liability for pollution damage arising from
offshore operations should be based on strict liability principles. Absolute liability
appears to be harsh and fault liability appears to be permissive in their application. It has
been asserted that the “strict liability doctrine should be utilized in public international
law because the concept is now accepted in nations throughout the world.”137
Nevertheless, the question often raised on the basis of equity is that “it may be too severe
135
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a burden upon the industry to make it strictly liable without any limitation.”138 However,
in the absence of negligence, leaving the loss where it fell would be unreasonable and
unfair to the sufferer of such loss.139 Indeed:
The creator of an abnormally great risk [should] be strictly liable because,
between the creator and the innocent victim, the one who engages in the
dangerous profit-making activity is best able to predict and allocate the
risk of loss. The enterprise can spread the loss through slightly higher
prices to consumers whereas an innocent victim cannot.140
Technological advancement and the increase in demand for petroleum products will
necessarily push upwards the incidence of offshore operations leading to an increase of
the pollution risk such activities pose to the marine environment. A potent and aggressive
civil liability regime should be established to cater for the unthinkable. A comprehensive
treaty with global reach is the key. All other ground is sinking sand.
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